Frank Sep. 7, 2014 in Waterloo, On. Ca.
Sep. 7, 2014, morning, I read the article Why They Still Hate Us, 13 Years Later, and was happily surprised by the rational comments of "Samuel Huntington, who once explained that Americans never recognize that, in the developing world, the key is not the kind of government - communist, capitalist, democratic, dictatorial - but the degree of government. That absence of government is what we are watching these days, from Libya to Iraq to Syria."
The rational and realistic vision on the reality inspired me to think about more.
As my view, today's chaotic world is caused by the partisan politics.
Sep. 28, 2013, in the article Canada: Hot Arguing on Religions' Social Value. I said with that:
"Vasily Grossman, a Soviet writer and journalist, who made an argument on the hazard when people grouping in his famous book Life and Fate:"
"'Human groupings have one main purpose: to assert everyone's right to be different, to be special, to think, feel and live in his or her own way. People join together in order to win or defend this right. But this is where a terrible, fateful error is born: the belief that these groupings in the name of a race, a God, a party or a State are the very purpose of life and not simply a means to an end. No! The only true and lasting meaning of the struggle for life lies in the individual, in his modest peculiarities and in his right to these peculiarities.'"
"Majority of the initial purpose when people grouping is good, and most people who group are kind-hearted in nature, however, the group would inevitably be controlled by the people who are lack of rational thinking, then, with the power of the group, they are more powerful to harm society."
"They will have no such harmful power as any individual."
"Bloody facts have proven that people grouping is the cradle of the evil."
Today, I say that the partisan polities act as the Garbage Absorbers, to attract those mental defectives human waste together and to help some of the defectives to seize the power that as individual can not get, and even control of the power of the State Apparatus, to gain the ability of the detriment of the world.
By the name of democracy and universal values, they made every effort to overthrow the governments that are governing the places where are most difficult to govern in the world, to make those regions into chaos, and become the hotbeds for nourishing evil to further destruct the world.
Following are some of my topics:
Oct. 16, 2013, It is high time to end the partisan politics
Feb. 02, 2014, It Is Time to Kick Out Brain-Defective Politicians by MRI Scan
May 27, 2014, The Dictatorship Orderly is Much Better than that of Democracy Disorderly
Mar. 07, 2014, By the Name of Democracy to Free Brain-defective killing Innocents
July 8 2014, The quality of the next US president Elizabeth Warren
Please look at Sep. 3, 2014 article US and allies consider military options for confronting Isis – as it happened and Sep. 03, 2014 article Conflicting Signals? Obama vows to 'destroy' ISIS, make it ‘manageable’.
The reports may induce us to think of that, in a few years ago, the United States mindlessly overthrew the effective government of Saddam Hussein to throw Iraq into anarchy chaos.
It was that the United States ignited wildfires in Iraq years ago, but today, it has no ability to eliminate the rapid expansion of the fire disaster, and to have to call on others for helping.
Rational people must reflect on that, for such a sad reality in Iraq, who is the chief culprit? is the dictatorial government of Saddam Hussein, or the democratic government of the United States?
Thanks Mr. Fareed Zakaria and his Mentor, professor Samuel P. Huntington, they have made clear answer for us already.
Here, we should also consider the problem that American politicians, besides, are actively advocating and promoting democracy that has push world into Chaos, also, they have been actively advocating and pursuing religious freedom.
Compared with the absurd democracy, the religion, even if some of, seems to be more evil, they are simply acting as the great schools that have been training more evil forces.
Such terrible reality raises a serious question that, is to continue to advocate freedom of religion？or to strict control of certain religions?
There is also a question that, for those countries are in unrest endlessly, such as, the Thailand, the Iraq, whether we should support stratocracy, by powerful military man to control the country to ensure a peace life for their people.
Sep. 7, 2014, I found the article that Dictatorship is the best path to development on the website of Debatewise, it cited following positive roles:
1. Dictatorships breed development though efficient and straighfoward decision making.
2. Dictatorship is a good breeding ground for personal discipline and order.
3. Dictatorships better control the variables of human development.
4. Dictatorships resist to income Redistribution Pressures
5. Dictatorship is a more economic institution: elections are a luxury reserved for developed countries.
6. Dictatorships regimes can be a path for countries move on from civil wars and focus on development.
7. Dictatorships have a flexibility in economic policy that breeds growth.
8. Dictatorship helps achieve social stability.
9. The loger lasting and biggest economic miracles have ocurred under dictatorships.
10. Dictatorship outperforms democracy in growth and economic develpment.
11. A dictatorship breeds order and it's a needed step for both development and liberal democracy.
12. Dictators have incentives to promote development and diminish social differences.
From above, we amy understand that the Dictatorship that American politicians have hated and have been struggling to eradicate also has its unique advantages.
It also provides a support for the view of the professor Samuel Huntington that the key is not the kind of government - communist, capitalist, democratic, dictatorial - but the degree of government.
A peaceful World requires pragmatic governance with allowing diversity of social systems.
The world has been so chaotic; the main reason is that those politicians who control the State Apparatus or Policy Making are mostly ignorant dogmatists without a rational ability for independent thinking.
I saerched some information and writings of Fareed Zakaria and his Mentor, professor Samuel Huntington as follow for facilitating reading.
Fareed Zakaria was born in Mumbai, Maharashtra, India in Jan. 20, 1964. He is an American journalist and author, the host of CNN's Fareed Zakaria GPS and writes a weekly column for The Washington Post. He was a columnist for Newsweek and editor of Newsweek International and then editor-at-large of Time. He is the author of three books, two of then international bestsellers, and the co-editor of one.
Samuel P. Huntington (April 18, 1927 – Dec. 24, 2008) was an influential conservative political scientist from the United States of America whose works covered multiple sub-fields of political science. He gained wider prominence through his Clash of Civilizations (1993, 1996) thesis of a post-Cold War new world order.
Why they still hate us, 13 years later
Watching the gruesome execution videos, I felt some of the same emotions I did after 9/11. Barbarism is designed to provoke anger, and it succeeded. But in September 2001, it also made me ask, “Why do they hate us?” I tried to answer that question in an essay for Newsweek that struck a chord with readers. I reread it to see what I got right and wrong and what I’ve learned in the past 13 years.
It’s not just al-Qaeda. I began by noting that Islamic terrorism is not the isolated behavior of a handful of nihilists. There is a broader culture that has been complicit or at least unwilling to combat it. Things have changed on this front but not nearly enough.
Fareed Zakaria writes a foreign affairs column for The Post. He is also the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and editor at large of Time magazine. View Archive
It’s not an Islam problem but an Arab problem. In the early 2000s, Indonesia was our biggest concern because of a series of terrorist attacks there after 9/11. But over the past decade, jihad and even Islamic fundamentalism have not done well in Indonesia — the largest Muslim country in the world, larger in that sense than Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya and the Gulf states put together. Or look at India, which is right next door to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s headquarters in Pakistan, but very few of its 165 million Muslims are members of al-Qaeda. Zawahiri has announced a bold effort to recruit Indian Muslims, but I suspect it will fail.
Arab political decay. The central point of the essay was that the reason the Arab world produces fanaticism and jihad is political stagnation. By 2001, almost every part of the world had seen significant political progress — Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America, even Africa had held many free and fair elections. But the Arab world remained a desert. In 2001, most Arabs had fewer freedoms than they did in 1951.
The one aspect of life that Arab dictators could not ban was religion, so Islam had become the language of political opposition. As the Westernized, secular dictatorships of the Arab world failed — politically, economically and socially — the fundamentalists told the people, “Islam is the solution.”
Key allies stand ready to join the United States in military action to defeat Islamic State militants in Iraq, President Obama said at the NATO summit in Wales. (Reuters)
The Arab world was left with dictatorships on one hand and deeply illiberal opposition groups on the other — Hosni Mubarak or al-Qaeda. The more extreme the regime, the more violent the opposition. This cancer was deeper and more destructive than I realized. Despite the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and despite the Arab Spring, this dynamic between dictators and jihadis has not been broken.
Look at Syria, where, until recently, Bashar al-Assad actually had been helping the Islamic State by buying oil and gas from it and shelling its opponents, the Free Syrian Army, when the two were battling each other. Assad was playing the old dictator’s game, giving his people a stark choice — it’s either me or the Islamic State. And many Syrians (the Christian minority, for example) have chosen him.
The greatest setback has been in Egypt, where a nonviolent Islamist movement took power and squandered its chance by overreaching. But not content to let the Muslim Brotherhood fail at the polls, the army displaced it by force and moved back into power. Egypt is now a more brutal police state than it was under Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood has been banned, many of its members killed or jailed, the rest driven underground. Let’s hope that ,10 years from now, we do not find ourselves discussing the causes of the rise of an Islamic State in Egypt.
What did I miss in that essay 13 years ago? The fragility of these countries. I didn’t recognize that if the dictatorships faltered, the state could collapse, and that beneath the state there was no civil society — nor, in fact, a real nation. Once chaos reigned across the Middle East, people reached not for their national identities — Iraqi, Syrian — but for much older ones: Shiite, Sunni, Kurd and Arab.
I should have paid greater attention to my mentor in graduate school, Samuel Huntington, who once explained that Americans never recognize that, in the developing world, the key is not the kind of government — communist, capitalist, democratic, dictatorial — but the degree of government. That absence of government is what we are watching these days, from Libya to Iraq to Syria.
Read more from Fareed Zakaria’s archive, follow him on Twitter or subscribe to his updates on Facebook.
Why his works on world order -- political and otherwise -- are still relevant today.
Of all of Samuel Huntington's contributions to the study of politics, the most important was his 1968 work Political Order in Changing Societies. This book was probably the last major attempt to write a general theory of political development, and its significance needs to be placed in the context of the ideas that were dominant in the 1950s and early 1960s. This was the heyday of "modernization theory," probably the most ambitious American attempt to create an integrated, empirical theory of human social change. Modernization theory had its origins in the works of late 19th-century European social theorists like Henry Maine, ?mile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Ferdinand T?nnies, and Max Weber. While based primarily on the experiences of early modernizers like Britain or the United States, they sought to draw from them general laws of social development.
European social theory was killed, literally and figuratively, by the two world wars. The ideas it generated migrated to the United States, and were taken up by a generation of American academics after the Second World War at places like Harvard University's Department of comparative politics, the MIT Center for International Studies, and the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics. The Harvard department, led by Weber's protégé Talcott Parsons, hoped to create an integrated, interdisciplinary social science that would combine economics, sociology, political science, and anthropology.
The period from the late 1940s to the early 1960s also corresponded to the dissolution of European colonial empires and the emergence of what became known as the third or developing world -- newly independent countries with great aspirations to modernize and catch up with their former colonial masters. Scholars like Edward Shils, Daniel Lerner, Lucian Pye, Gabriel Almond, David Apter, and Walt Whitman Rostow saw these momentous developments as a laboratory for social theory, as well as a great opportunity to help developing countries raise living standards and democratize their political systems.
If one were to sum up the Americanized version of modernization theory, it was the sunny view that all good things went together: Economic growth, social mobilization, political institutions, and cultural values all changed for the better in tandem. There was none of the tragic sense of loss that one sees in Weber's concepts of disenchantment or the iron cage of capitalism, or in Durkheim's anomie. The different dimensions of social change were part of a seamless and mutually supportive process.
Political Order in Changing Societies appeared against this backdrop and frontally challenged these assumptions. First, Huntington argued that political decay was at least as likely as political development and that the actual experience of newly independent countries was one of increasing social and political disorder. Second, he suggested that the good things of modernity often operated at cross-purposes. In particular, if social mobilization outpaced the development of political institutions, there would be frustration as new social actors found themselves unable to participate in the political system.
Political Order pointed out that from the vantage point of the year 1968, political development was not occurring in much of the recently independent, former colonial world. The world was rather characterized by coups, civil wars, upheavals, and political instability. Huntington suggested that if the pace of social mobilization outran the ability of political institutions to incorporate new actors, you would get a condition that he called praetorianism, or political breakdown and political decay.
It is safe to say that Political Order finally killed off modernization theory. It was part of a pincers attack, the other prong of which was the critique from the left that said that modernization theorists enshrined an ethnocentric European or North American model of social development as a universal one for humanity to follow. American social science found itself suddenly without an overarching theory and began its subsequent slide into its current methodological Balkanization.
Huntington drew a practical implication from these observations, namely that political order was a good thing in itself and would not automatically arise out of the modernization process. Rather the contrary: Without political order, neither economic nor social development could proceed successfully. The different components of modernization needed to be sequenced. Premature increases in political participation -- including things like early elections -- could destabilize fragile political systems. This laid the groundwork for a development strategy that came to be called the "authoritarian transition," whereby a modernizing dictatorship provides political order, a rule of law, and the conditions for successful economic and social development. Once these building blocks were in place, other aspects of modernity like democracy and civic participation could be added. (Huntington's student, Fareed Zakaria, would write a book in 2003, The Future of Freedom, making a somewhat updated variant of this argument.)
This argument is still very much with us. In the wake of America's flawed nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, many people have suggested the need for sequencing in development, putting state-building ahead of efforts to democratize and expand political participation.
Political Order in Changing Societies was one of Huntington's earlier works, and one that established his stature as a political scientist, but it was far from his last major contribution to comparative politics. His work on democratic transition also became a point of reference in the period after the end of the Cold War. Ironically, this stream of writing began with a 1984 article in Political Science Quarterly titled "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Surveying the situation following the Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin American democratic transitions of the 1970s and early 1980s, Huntington made the case that the world was not likely to see more shifts from authoritarianism in the near future given inauspicious structural and international conditions. This was written, of course, a mere five years before the fall of the Berlin Wall. He shifted gears quickly after the collapse of communism, however, and wrote The Third Wave, a book that gave the name to the entire period.
The Third Wave's take on democratization was, however, different from many others in the field, which focused either on agency (as in the Schmitter-O'Donnell-Whitehead series) or on structural conditions for democratic stability (as in the tradition running from Seymour Lipset through Adam Pzreworski). Huntington noted that the vast bulk of Third Wave transitions had occurred in culturally Christian countries and that there was a distinct religious underpinning to the pattern of democratization in the late 20th century. The Catholic world, in particular, was catching up to the Protestant first movers, just as Catholic societies had come late to the capitalist revolution.
The Third Wave was not, however, a manifestation of a broader cross-cultural modernization process that would eventually encompass all societies, but one rooted in a particular set of cultural values inherited from Western Christianity. Democracy's spread after the early 1970s did not rest on its universal appeal, but rather had to do with the power and prestige of the United States and other culturally Christian societies.
Although it may not have been obvious at the time, The Third Wave anticipated by this argument many of the themes that would be reprised in much greater detail in The Clash of Civilizations and Who Are We?, as well as in the volume that Huntington and Lawrence Harrison edited titled Culture Matters. In perhaps an even deeper rebuff to modernization theory than the one made famous in Political Order, Huntington believed deeply in the durability of cultural values and the primacy of religion as a shaper of both national political development and international relations. In the face of this, globalization was a superficial force that created the thinnest veneer of cosmopolitan "Davos men" and would not in the end guarantee peace or prosperity. And the United States did not represent the vanguard of a universalizing democratic movement; rather, it was successful due to its origins as an "Anglo-Protestant" society. His last scholarly efforts prior to his passing focused on the impact of religion on world politics.
Huntington is incontrovertibly right that historically the origin of modern democracy is, as he says, rooted in Western Christianity. This is not a new insight; thinkers from Tocqueville to Hegel to Nietzsche have all observed that in many ways modern democracy is in fact a secularized version of the universalism of Christian doctrine. But the fact that it arises in a particular historical context doesn't mean that it can't subsequently have universal application. To the extent that democracy has spread, it is because it is an effective method of holding rulers accountable to their people, and not simply because of its cultural prestige. If China ever becomes a democracy, it will not be because ordinary Chinese people so admire Americans and want to emulate them; it will be because they cannot solve their own problems of political corruption, environmental degradation, and social injustice without a greater degree of downward accountability.
Similarly, Who Are We? makes a similarly incontrovertible assertion -- that American identity is not simply allegiance to the Constitution and the American creed, but that it has religious roots in what he calls "Anglo-Protestant culture." He says early on in that book that 'If North America had not been founded by Anglo-Saxon Protestant Englishmen but by Spanish, Portuguese, or French Catholics, it wouldn't be the United States -- it would be Mexico, Brazil, or Quebec.' But again, while this assertion is historically true, the question it raises is whether this historical fact actually makes a difference in contemporary American politics. Huntington spends a whole chapter on the famous Protestant work ethic, which he sees as deeply embedded in American character and central to American identity. But if you ask who is it who actually works hard in the United States today, it is not likely to be either old-line Boston Brahmin WASPs who are clipping their coupons from their trust funds, nor the Scotch-Irish who settled in a band from Appalachia through Texas to the Southwest, who have one of the lowest per capita incomes of all American ethnic groups. That modal American culture is now borne by Russian cab drivers, Korean grocery store owners, and Mexican day laborers because it has a kind of universal appeal and universal accessibility.
Huntington's arguments were always made with great force, erudition, and persuasiveness. Even if one disagreed with him, it was impossible to not take his arguments with the greatest seriousness. They provided vocabulary and structure to all subsequent discussions of the topic, whether it was American politics, defense policy, democratic transition, or American identity. In addition to his written work, he was a great teacher and produced an entire generation of students who have reshaped virtually all the subfields of political science. From his earliest writings to his last works, he has drawn vociferous critics, but that is the mark of a scholar who has important and fundamental things to say. It is a safe bet that we won't see his like for some time to come.
This article is based on a 2008 piece on the website of the American Interest and the preface to the 2006 edition of Political Order in Changing Societies.
A man of towering intellect, who never shied away from going for the jugular.
The first time I met Sam Huntington, I was not yet his student; I was an intern for the New Republic. I was still an undergraduate at Yale, and there was a peculiar campaign being waged by a Yale math professor named Serge Lang to deny Sam Huntington a seat in the National Academy of Sciences. I was intrigued by the whole thing, so I went to interview Huntington.
He was more troubled by the campaign than I would have ever imagined. The basic premise was this: Sam was a hawk in general, and during the Vietnam War, he had written a number of pieces, including a long report for the government and a couple of articles in Foreign Affairs, on the matter. Lang believed that this made him effectively a war criminal and argued that Sam should therefore not be part of the National Academy of Sciences. In fact, while he was a hawk on this particular issue, Sam was actually on the dovish side of the debate. He was arguing that the United States needed a much more political, rather than military, strategy in Vietnam. But Lang was fixated on one page of Sam's work.
What I remember most, however, isn't the details of the case, but how transfixed I was just sitting there talking to Huntington, thinking to myself, "this is so fascinating." He was able to take policy debates and frame them in a much broader theoretical context. Sam was able to explain to you what confirms and what falsifies your argument.
A couple of years later, as a Ph.D. student at Harvard, I started working for Sam myself.
Today, in commemoration of Huntington's work at Harvard, I imagine the question for most of you is why you should care about Sam Huntington and why you should read his books. I think more than anything else, Sam Huntington represented the view that social science is about connecting two large variables: the dependent and independent variable. Sam would often say to me, "You have to find a big independent variable and a big dependent variable." In other words, you've got to start with something big to explain. If you're trying to explain something trivial, who cares? Then, if you try to explain the French Revolution, you have to have a powerful reason to explain it. If you have 19 reasons that explain the French Revolution, nobody cares. He once said to me, "If you tell people the world is complicated, you're not doing your job as a social scientist. They already know it's complicated. Your job is to distill it, simplify it, and give them a sense of what is the single, or what are the couple, of powerful causes that explain this powerful phenomenon."
That's always stayed with me as the central insight that Sam Huntington had for his students, particularly at a time, and in an academic profession, in which the instinct was to go for the capillary rather than the jugular. Sam always went for the jugular. If you look at his books, he always asked, what are the biggest things in the world that need to be explained? And what do I think is going on there? He did it with post-colonial development, with American politics when it seemed to be spiraling out of control in the 1970s, with the end of the Cold War, where he saw a resurgence of ethnic and religious identity. Whether you agree or disagree with his conclusions, what is striking is how he never shied away from taking on big questions. Walter Lippmann once said, "Most people mumble because they are afraid of the sound of their own voices." When you put yourself out there, people will disagree with you, and Sam had his fair share of that. People disagreed with him vigorously, but he was trying to shed some very powerful light on what was going on in the world. And he did so in so many different fields.
To me, Sam Huntington's most important book remains Political Order in Changing Societies. That's the book that really changed the way I look at the world. Today, if you are puzzling the question of whether China will get more democratic as it gets richer, this is the book to read. Huntington takes you back in history and makes you understand why the United States has a tough time understanding whether societies become democratic as their economies modernize. I read the book when I was 22 or 23 years old, and I can still remember it vividly. How many books can you say that about when you're 46, in my case?
Sam Huntington was also a man of great character, with a very strong will and very strong beliefs. I remember once reading a furious attack of his work and asking him why he didn't respond. He said, "Well you know, Fareed, my view has always been that you put your best work out, you let people attack you, and then you move on. You can spend your whole life getting caught up in letters to the editor, and 'I didn't say this and I didn't say that,' but it's pointless. The best thing you can do is write the next book which will cause disagreements among people." I thought that was such a fascinating way to look at his role as an intellectual. In many ways, he was thin-skinned like all of us. But he was able to rise above it and act out of this higher mission, this calling.
He was also a man of great principle. It was not always a principle that was popular, a principle that people agreed with. I remember one case when he was chairing an administrative session at the Olin Institute, of which he was the director. The administrative assistant explained that there was a lot of pressure from the university for the institute's brochure to say something like, "We especially welcome and invite blacks and Hispanics to apply to these fellowships." The dean had thought that this would be just a matter of course -- to just throw in the phrase and it would be fine. But Sam said, "You know, I really can't go along with that. I feel very awkward sending special invitations to people based on their descriptive qualities, so you'll have to tell the dean I won't do it." As I say, you may agree or disagree with it, but there's a certain steel to his core that he simply would not compromise, even when it was a trivial matter.
Finally, Sam was a great mentor and believed very much in the human dimension of mentoring. He was a WASP in every sense of the word, and he was emotive very rarely. But there were very few professors who would invite vast numbers of students to their place on Martha's Vineyard and plan a whole day of fun and festivities. He and his wife Nancy used to have us over for these sorts of things. He was representative of some of the best qualities that make Harvard great: great intellectual standards but also a very real emphasis on the human element.
So I think back on Sam Huntington first and foremost as one of the most towering intellects I have ever come across, but also as a great human being and a man of enormous character. As I get older, I feel as though one learns a lot from books, but one also learns a lot from human beings -- and from the character of a man.
Samuel Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations" Author
Filed: 1/2/09 at 7:00 PM Updated: 3/13/10 at 6:10 PM Under: World
If there is one central, recurring mistake the United States makes when dealing with the rest of the world, it is to assume that creating political stability is easy. We overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, and then cavalierly dismantled the entire structure of the Iraqi state, sure that we could simply set up a new one. We toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan and were confident that with foreign aid, elections and American know-how, we would build a new, modern Afghan nation. After all, the governments we were helping to set up—democratic, secular and inclusive—were so much better than the ones that preceded them. We should have paid more attention to the words of a wise man who opened one of his pioneering studies by declaring that "the most important distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government."
Look around. So many of the world's problems—from terrorists in Waziristan to the devastating AIDS epidemic in Africa to piracy in Somalia—are caused or made worse by governments that are unable to exercise real authority over their lands or people. That was the central insight of Samuel P. Huntington, the greatest political scientist of the last half-century, who died on Christmas Eve.
Huntington is most famous for "The Clash of Civilizations," but his scholarly reputation properly rests on his earlier work. His analysis of political order had immediate, real-world applications. While studying the topic, he was asked by Lyndon Johnson's administration to assess the progress of the Vietnam War. After touring the place he argued, in 1967 and 1968, that America's strategy in South Vietnam was fatally flawed. The Johnson administration was trying to buy the people's support through aid and development. But money wasn't the key, in Huntington's view. The segments of South Vietnam's population that had resisted the Viet Cong's efforts had done so because they were secure within effective local communities structured around religious or ethnic ties. The United States, however, wanted to create a modern Vietnamese nation and so refused to reinforce these "backward" sources of authority. This 40-year-old analysis describes our dilemma in Afghanistan today.
Newsweek Magazine is Back In Print
Huntington noticed a troubling trend. Sometimes, progress American style—more political participation or faster economic growth—actually created more problems than it solved. If a country had more people who were economically, politically and socially active and yet lacked effective political institutions, such as political parties, civic organizations or credible courts, the result was greater instability. That has been the story of parts of the Third World over the past three decades. Think of Pakistan, whose population has gone from 68 million in 1975 to 165 million today, while its government has proved ill equipped to tackle the basic tasks of education, security and social welfare.
Living through change, people have often stuck with their oldest and most durable source of security: religion. That was the most important message of "The Clash of Civilizations." While others were celebrating the fall of communism and the rise of globalization, he saw that with ideology disappearing as a source of human identity, religion was returning to the fore.
My own relationship with that particular work is complicated. Huntington asked me to comment on a draft of the essay while I was his graduate student. I told him that while I disagreed with central elements of it, the essay was riveting and thought-provoking. A few months later, as the new managing editor of Foreign Affairs, I helped publish it. I still think he got some important things wrong, but much in that essay is powerful and prescient.
My relationship with Sam Huntington, however, was uncomplicated. I admired him through and through. He was brilliant—a prodigy who graduated from Yale at 18, a pathbreaking scholar and a devoted and generous teacher.
He was remarkably broad. His first book practically invented the field of civil-military relations; his last was on demographics and culture. He was also broad-minded. While many academics of his age and political persuasion—temperamentally conservative— were seared by the campus chaos of the 1960s, Huntington saw the student radicals as part of a recurring tradition of American puritans, righteously enraged that American institutions didn't live up to the country's founding principles. He closed one of his books, another classic, by noting of such critics, "[They] say that America is a lie because its reality falls so far short of its ideals. They are wrong. America is not a lie; it is a disappointment. But it can be a disappointment only because it is also a hope."
I learned from the books but also from the man. I never saw Sam Huntington do anything deceitful or malicious, never saw him sacrifice his principles for power or access or expedience. He lived by the Anglo-Protestant principles he cherished: hard work, honesty, fair play, courage, loyalty and patriotism.
In Robert Bolt's play about Sir Thomas More, "A Man for All Seasons," the young Richard Rich wonders whether it is worthwhile to be a teacher. "If I was [a fine teacher], who would know it?" More answers, "You; your pupils; your friends; God. Not a bad public, that." Not bad at all.
The E.U. is the world’s great no-show
The Ukraine crisis has shone a spotlight on one of the glaring gaps in the world: the lack of a strategic and purposeful Europe. The United States can and should lead on the response to this conflict, but nothing can really happen without Europe. The European Union is by far Russia’s largest trading partner — it buys much of Russia’s energy, is the major investor in Russian companies and is the largest destination for Russian capital. Some of President Obama’s critics want him to scold Vladimir Putin. But ultimately, it is European actions that the Russian president will worry about.
Consider how Europe has dealt with Ukraine. For years, it could not really decide whether it wanted to encourage Ukrainian membership in the union, so it sent mixed signals to Kiev, which had the initial effect of disappointing pro-European Ukrainians, angering Russians and confusing everyone else.
Fareed Zakaria writes a foreign affairs column for The Post. He is also the host of CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and editor at large of Time magazine. View Archive
In 2008, after Moscow sent troops into Georgia, Europe promised an “Eastern partnership” to the countries along Europe’s eastern fringe. But, as Neil MacFarlane and Anand Menon point out in the current issue of the journal Survival, “The Eastern partnership was a classic example of the EU’s proclivity for responding to events by adding long-term and rhetorically impressive, but resource-poor, bolt-ons to existing policy.”
European leaders were beginning to woo Ukraine without recognizing how this would be perceived in Russia. Moscow had its own plans for a customs union, to be followed by a Eurasian Union, which was meant to be a counter to the European Union. Ukraine was vital to Russia’s plans and was dependent on Russia for cheap natural gas. Plus, of course, Ukrainians were divided over whether to move west or east.
Negotiations between the European Union and Ukraine for an association agreement meandered along, with the lawyers and translators taking a year to work out the text. In describing this tardiness as a mistake, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said, “The same thing applies to the [European] Union as to the Vatican. God’s mills grind slowly but surely.” The deal that was offered to Ukraine was full of demands for reform and restructuring of its corrupt economy, but it had little in the way of aid to soften the blows and sweeten the pot. When then-President Viktor Yanukovych rejected Europe’s offer and sided with Moscow, he set in motion a high-speed, high-stakes game that Europe was utterly unprepared for and could not respond to.
If Europe was trying to move Ukraine into its camp, it should have been more generous to Kiev and negotiated seriously with Moscow to assuage its concerns. Instead, Europe seemed to act almost unaware of the strategic consequences of its actions. Then when Russia began a campaign to destabilize Ukraine — which persists to this day — Europe remained a step behind, internally conflicted and unwilling to assert itself clearly and quickly. Those same qualities have been on display following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17.
The European Union still has a chance to send a much clearer signal to Ukraine, Russia and the world. It could demand that Russia pressure the separatists to cooperate fully with the investigation of Flight 17 and allow the Ukrainian government — which Moscow recognizes — to take control of its own territory in eastern Ukraine. It could put forward a list of specific sanctions that would be implemented were those conditions not met within, say, two weeks.
In addition, Europe should announce longer-term plans on two fronts, first to gain greater energy independence from Russian oil and gas. European nations must also reverse a two-decade downward spiral in defense spending that has made the E.U. a paper tiger in geopolitical terms. Germany, for example, spends about 1.5 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, among the lowest rates in Europe and well below the 2 percent that is the target for all NATO members. It’s hard for a country’s voice to be heard and feared when it speaks softly and carries a twig.
The problem is now being described as European cowardice and appeasement. It is better explained by an absence of coherence among the European Union’s 28 very different countries, a lack of strategic direction and a parochial inward orientation that looks for the world’s problems to go away. The result is a great global vacuum, with terrible consequences.
If we look back years from now and wonder why the liberal, open, rule-based international order weakened and eroded, we might well note that the world’s most powerful political and economic unit, the European Union, with a population and economy larger than America’s, was the great no-show on the international stage.
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“在发展中世界，问题的关键不是政府统治的形式——共产主义、资本主义，民主、独裁——而是政府统治的程度。”作者的思考与张维为等学者强调的“良政”、“劣政”不无相通之处，也是金融危机后，反思西方“民主”教条 的回响。但遗憾的是，作者通过阐述 “独裁者和圣战者”间的张力，巧妙回避了西方在推翻中东多国政权时的角色。
本文原载于《华盛顿邮报》，原题“Why They Still Hate Us, 13 Years Later”，观察者网宋帅译，岑少宇校。】
我应当多关注自己读研究生时的导师塞缪尔·亨廷顿，他曾经解释说，美国从来不会意识到，在发展中世界，问题的关键不是政府统治的形式——共产主义、资本主义，民主、独裁——而是政府统治的程度（degree of government）。这些时日我们从利比亚到伊拉克到叙利亚，看到的恰恰是政府的缺位。
【美国记者詹姆斯·弗莱遭恐怖分子毒手的画面令人震惊。凶手的英国国籍更是让欧洲国家坐立不安。不过源自英国的伊斯兰圣战分子却并不是最近才突然才冒出来的。英国时评人道格拉斯·穆瑞详细回顾了近20年有关英国籍伊斯兰圣战分子的案例。原文发表于《旁观者》（The Spectator）网站，原题“Britain’s beheaders —— how we came to export jihad”，观察者网李晽译。】
It is the now familiar nightmare image. A kneeling prisoner, and behind him a black-hooded man speaking to camera. The standing man denounces the West and claims that his form of Islam is under attack. He then saws off the head of the hostage. Why did Wednesday morning’s video stand out? Because this time the captive was an American journalist —James Foley— and his murderer is speaking in an unmistakable London accent.
The revulsion with which this latest Islamist atrocity has been greeted is of course understandable. But it is also surprising. This is no one-off, certainly no anomaly. Rather it is the continuation of an entirely foreseeable trend. Britain has long been a global hub of terror export, so much so that senior US government officials have suggested the next attack on US soil is likely to come from UK citizens. All countries — from Australia to Scandinavia — now have a problem with Islamic extremists. But the world could be forgiven for suspecting that Britain has become the weak link in the international fight against jihadism. And they would be right. This is not even the first beheading of an American journalist to have been arranged by a British man from London.
In 2002, 27-year-old Omar Sheikh was in Pakistan. A north London-born graduate of a private school and the London School of Economics, he had gone to fight in the Balkans and Kashmir in the 1990s. In 1994 he was arrested and jailed for his involvement in the kidnapping of three Britons and an American in India. Released in 1999 in exchange for the passengers and crew of the hijacked Air India flight IC-814, he was subsequently connected to the bombing of an American cultural centre in Calcutta in January 2002 and that same month organised the kidnapping and beheading of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.
Some of the 492 comments
1stAmendment_101 ? 18 days ago
You Brits need to take your country back. Reading about muslim enclaves in London is disheartening to say the least. You must stick to the rule of law and reject all the Sharia nonsense. The other problem is the bleeding heart labor party. Like our democrats they will take you down a road of self destruction! You can be kind and charitable without being a socialist fool!
Richard ? 18 days ago
Sorry, but sad to say, Brits are far too thick/apathetic to do anything about this. An organism, whether biological or political, can only survive by adapting to changing threat. That is how an immune-system works. The UK cannot adapt, it is too moribund. And so it will die. For the past sixty years we have had wave after wave after wave of vibrantly diverse immigration which has sent murder and crime rates sky-rocketing, made our cities unpleasant places in which to live, and taken our level of national culture back to the bush. Nothing will change, because there is nothing left of the UK. The vibrantly diverse know this, and know that we know this, and so just sit patiently by, until we are exactly the same as their countries. That is what this is all about: the cultural and genetic destruction of anything not like them. Laws and social niceties mean nothing to these people. This is all about genitals and lebensraum.
Mrs Josephine Hyde-Hartley > Richard ? 18 days ago
Cheer up. Some of us may be wise enough to understand how meaningless are these images and symbols - without being disrespectful to any one of the tragic victims ie the ordinary people and workers who are being slaughtered.
It might not be such a bad thing that here in the UK we've become so inured to symbols and images of horror and violence. We know of course what our position is in the face of this thing called IS, or any other fallacious affectation of power.
So if you ask me, the whole IS concern is short of a dose of real common sense, that's all, which will only come out of the hearts and minds of ordinary people - because it's only ordinary people who can fight the really good fight against evil of any shape or form.
Nwoye Mgbankwo ? 18 days ago
This was a long time coming.
British colonial policy was to elevate Muslims as a "noble martial race". Thus we had the "Noble Bedouin" nonsense, the "Lawrence of Arabia myth", the "Muslim rulers of Northern Nigeria having an Aryan admixture" myth (as opposed to the "heathen barbarians of the South").
We had Oxbridge educated "Arabists" - men full of their own self-importance & inherent sense of superiority; who thought they held the "puppet strings" that controlled the World. Thank God that nonsense is over and discredited.
This is like cosmic justice - after reading all the nonsense British colonial administrators like Lugard wrote about the "inherent superiority of the Muslim Martial races" (or something very silly like that) - one can only say this: "karma is a bitch".
So dear Britons - the "noble savages" your "great colonial administrators" wrote so eloquently about 100 years ago - are doing what they do best:
Deanna Clark ? 18 days ago
The day after 9-11 I was concerned about reprisals to our Moslem citizenry. Being an easy-going Christian, I went to a deli owned by Moslems, an Arab with an American wife in full Moslem dress. I just wanted to say, "I'll pray for your safety, in case this gets worse." Feelings were very high, even in this sleepy place.
However, I was treated to a long lecture on how my religion was crap. I couldn't finish my little speech of concern. Dismissed as a loser and apostate, I took off my unflattering scarf and went to church.
I don't understand such aggression to one bringing only good will.
The kind, decent Moslems need to explain themselves and FAST. I assumed Arabs were honor bound to be courteous to guests. Instead that honor is fading fast.
sarahsmith232 ? 18 days ago
Good luck trying to find someone on the Left that gets our foreign policy has didely squat effect, zero to do with the cause of this. The evidence for this should have been starting people in the face for years. Any time there's some minor conflict in some minor league 3rd world country up will pop a whole host of Africans/Muslims/Non-whites of any description doing their - 'you're to blame for this, you could have stopped it but you didn't intervene, the reason why you didn't do anything is because you didn't care, the reason why you didn't care is because you're all - insert persecution complex of your choosing.
We were to blame for Boko Haram. We were to blame for Bosnia. We were to blame for the Assad regime. We were to blame for genocide here, pogroms there, forced labour camps thousands of miles away, prisoners of political conscience in country's we've never had any contact with, all because we have been choosing NOT to intervene not because of an aggressive, interventionist foreign policy.
Foreign policy that is non-interventionist is a far bigger driver solely and only because these people are being driven by their ego's, they will seek out whatever set of excuses explain to them that they've all victims of the ignorant, imperialist White. We can't intervene each every time a civil war breaks out across the world but this doesn't matter to them. Our not intervening plays out for their ego's as evidence of our selfish, gross Imperialist nature. That this is obviously idiotic can't occur to them. And not just 'cause most of them are absolutely stupid. Check the BBC's 'The History of the Jews'. Simon Schama is an e.g of this. He blames us for not intervening to end pogroms and our not intervening against Hitler earlier, cites this as evidence of our gross anti-Semitism, then uses this as an excuse for Israel's worst excesses of violence in the creation of the Jewish State.
Anyone that hears themselves saying 'our foreign policy is to blame for this' needs to start paying more attention. They are just looking for an excuse to see themselves as victims of the racist/fascist/ignorant imperialist white. They'll take on whatever illogical set of excuses that can feed to their ego's, anything at all, non intervention being a far bigger one than Iraq and Afghanistan.
Rich ? 18 days ago
There is still a little too much pussy-footing around the word Islam - except our politicians are not even pussy-footing around, their complete ignorance (feigning or otherwise) is a gross dereliction of their duty to protect citizens of this country.
It is an indisputable fact that the Qur'an and the hundreds of thousands of Hadith which make up various interpretations of the Sunna (the prophet's life) - when aligned to specific Islamic schools of jurisprudence (which are many and varied) - legitimise the actions of ISIS and other barbaric Islamic groups. I do not want to hear the words "ISIS are un-Islamic" - it seems crazy how the so called 'few extremists' on our streets are the ones actually telling us the truth! The day when Muslim Groups renounce and remove the texts which permit and legitimise these actions as Islamic is the day when maybe Islam can start to claim to be a "religion of peace". Sadly, such is the lack of introspection or critique allowed of Islam, this seems as likely as the Government waking up to the threat that we currently face and doing something about it. And the irony of Islam having probably the most liberal and uncontrolled interpretation of any religious / ideological texts isn't lost on me......
llanystumdwy > Mike ? 17 days ago
Well said. I would like to add that our political parties and journalists are afraid to face up to the truth and that is why this problem has gone out of control. They have pretended that these savages in Islamic State are a bunch of misguided youngsters radicalised by the Internet and the West's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, Islam is in conflict all over the world - in India, Russia, Nigeria (Boko Haram) as well as much of their own world in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and so on. At the heart of these people is their belief that only Islam matters and anyone else is an infidel who must die. These people cannot accept a plural world, and that is something the world must confront , otherwise, we will all ultimately be forced to convert to their vile beliefs or die. Furthermore, I am not convinced that the seeds of their hatred is only coming from the Internet. Where is the proof for these assumptions that the media constantly claim? We live in a secular liberal democratic society, and if we value the rights of all we must confront these and their unacceptable behaviour in a civilised world.
Holly > English Majority ? 18 days ago
I do not need to watch someone die in such a horrible way to understand what needs to be done here at home to cauterise the enemy within.
I am female, not stupid.
I can work out the details myself, without going 'searching' for it, just to make sure I'm not underestimating stuff like this 'cos I'm a female.
We are not all false boobs and eyelashes you know.
I take great offence that you think females are somehow 'helping' the Muslim damage control.
They were 'damaged' in my eyes long before this....
and,(you're gonna love this bit) if I'm not mistaken it was a bunch of blokes who created this mess, and another bunch of blokes failing to do anything about it.
In fact the reason I will never watch this is out of respect for this young man's family and friends.
...And my mental images of this young man far outweighs yours.